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The New Biopower: Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and the Obfuscation of 
International Collective Responsibility1 
 
Celine Tan 
Lecturer in Law 
Birmingham Law School 
University of Birmingham 
 
 
Abstract 
 
As successors to structural adjustment programmes, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
(PRSPs) were introduced in 1999 as preconditions for World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) concessional financing and for debt relief. PRSPs now serve as the 
basis of negotiations for a variety of development financing and have influenced the 
design of other aid instruments. This paper considers the impact of the PRSP framework 
on the constitution of global economic governance, in particular its effect in foreclosing 
possibilities for a radical revision of the rules and institutions of international economic 
law. The paper argues that the PRSP project not only reframes fundamental tenets of 
international cooperation and global communal responsibility but also establishes a new 
disciplinary framework for third world state engagement with the global economy and 
the international law which sustains it. Consequently, the danger of the PRSP project is 
that the discourse and methods of resistance against the injustices of the international 
order have been appropriated to distil such dissent through qualified operationalising of 
contestable notions of ‘participation, ‘ownership’, ‘partnership’ and ‘poverty reduction’, 
disabling the resurgence of any form of emancipatory politics in the international 
economic order, whether through a state-led NIEO-style revival or cosmopolitan social 
movement. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) were introduced in 1999 as preconditions for 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) concessional financing and for debt 
relief. The official premise of the PRSP framework seeks to redress the economic 
relativism of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) by framing a conceptual 
approach to development financing that goes beyond the fiscal and monetary 
straightjacket of SAPs and, at the same time, redressing the democratic deficits inherent 
in the process of accessing such financing by enabling a more inclusive framework to 
social and economic policymaking.  
 
The PRSP framework operationalises such concepts as ‘poverty reduction’, ‘participation’ 
and ‘country ownership’ of economic adjustment and stabilisation programmes through 
instituting procedural and substantive prerequisites for access to debt relief and 
concessional financing from the Bretton Woods institutions, most notably through the 
institution of the participatory policymaking process in PRSP countries and the 
prioritisation of social sector expenditure in national economic planning. 
 
This paper considers the impact of the PRSP framework on the constitution of global 
economic governance, in particular its effect in foreclosing possibilities for a radical 
revision of the rules and institutions of international economic law. It does so, firstly, 
through a historical reading of the PRSP narrative, exploring the context in which the 
PRSP is conceived and implemented and secondly, through an exploration of the 
conceptual and operational premise of the PRSP approach. 
 
The paper argues that the PRSP project reframes fundamental tenets of international 
cooperation and global communal responsibility by a) problematising the state in the 
context of economic and social development; and b) constituting the nation state as 
primary sites for the fulfilment of economic and social rights ascribed collectively. In the 
PRSP discourse, the challenges of meeting developmental objectives and overcoming 
socio-economic exclusion – both of nation states and communities within them – in the 
globalised, interdependent era reside in the reconstitution of the state apparatus at the 
domestic level and not in the stemming of the currents of neoliberal globalisation 
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through international mechanisms and resolution of structural iniquities at the global 
level. 
 
Thus, it is argued here that the PRSP framework represents a continuation, if not an 
exacerbation of the asymmetrical sovereignty that characterises postcolonial 
‘international’ law and the imperial nature of the ‘development project’ which has 
sustained the logic of this asymmetrical ‘multilateral’ relationship2. Further, the new 
regulatory framework emerging from this restructuring of fundamental relationships 
between actors, states and institutions party to the PRSPs is one that is reflective of the 
shifting modalities of power at the global level, marking the transition from a what 
Foucault terms a ‘disciplinary society’ to that of a ‘society of control’,3 with ramifications 
for third world engagement with international law. 
 
 
PRSPS AND THE NEW ‘SOCIAL CONTRACT’ 
 
SUCCESSORS TO STRUCTURAL ADJUTSMENT 
 
PRSPs have become the focus for much of the policy dialogue and negotiations for 
official development financing between low-income countries4, international financial 
institutions (IFIs) and bilateral and multilateral financiers in recent years. PRSPs have 
been described as the greatest the change in development financing since the 
introduction of structural adjustment lending in the early 1980s,5 reflecting not only a 
shift in the institutional structure of development financing but also in the discourse of 
development and the nature of these financing relationships. PRSPs are now established 
in a large share of low-income countries – as of July 2010, over 98 full PRSPs and over 
50 interim PRSPs have been presented to the IMF and World Bank Executive Boards, 
with a number of countries submitting their second PRSP and a couple, their third6. 
 
The PRSP is primarily a document outlining a country’s national economic policy with a 
focus with a focus on a programme of poverty reduction and participatory policymaking. 
Aside from identifying the nature, sources and incidences of poverty in the country, a 
PRSP must also detail how the country will generate resources for poverty reduction, 
including plans to restructure the economy accordingly, as well as how the resources 
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generated, including those from concessional financing and debt relief, will be utilised to 
ameliorate poverty and achieve other developmental objectives established in the PRSP.7  
 
Support from official financiers subscribing to the PRSP approach will be contingent 
upon the production of a PRSP, or at the very least, an interim-PRSP (I-PRSP). 
Evaluation of countries’ compliance with the PRSP criteria is conducted primarily by the 
Bank and the Fund through the Joint Staff Advisory Note (JSAN) process which will 
assess the PRS in relation to its suitability to form the basis of financial support from the 
Bank, Fund and other financiers.8 
 
PRSPs serve as preconditions for debt relief under the enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPC) initiative and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI). These 
documents also replaced the Policy Framework Papers (PFPs) as pre-requisites for grant 
financing and lending from the World Bank’s concessional lending arm, the International 
Development Association (IDA) and for concessional lending from the IMF9.  
 
Each PRSP is required to be: (1) nationally owned, meaning the strategies outlined in the 
PRSP is generated by the constituencies it purports to serve and by the government of 
the country involved in the process; and (2) formulated in a participatory manner, 
involving a wide range of government and civil society actors, including representatives 
of ‘the poor’ to whom these policies are directed. This is institutionalised in a 
participatory Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) process, a mechanism through which 
intra-governmental, inter-governmental and non-governmental dialogue is established 
with a range of stakeholders and policy formulated via a process of representation, 
consultation and engagement between all parties. 
 
The participatory process is reinforced by a series of strategic interventions into client 
countries’ domestic governance apparatuses through the framing of universal 
development goals and targets (linked primarily to the Millennium Development Goals – 
MDGs10); the coupling of such targets and indicators to actionable programmes and 
policies, including appropriate macroeconomic and structural reforms;  the linking of 
these prioritised public actions to government budgets and public financial management 
(PFM) or public expenditure management (PEM) systems; and the establishment of 
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monitoring systems to oversee implementation and ‘facilitate adjustments in policies and 
programs’.11  
 
‘MUTUAL ACCOUNTABILITY’ THROUGH ASYMTERIC INTERVENTIONS 
 
From the point of view of PRSP proponents, the PRSP process rebalances the power 
asymmetries inherent in international development financing and injects a measure of 
agency and accountability into a process hitherto fraught with opaque and hierarchical 
decision-making. Cash-strapped countries now possess the operational framework 
through which social and economic priorities may be developed in a consultative manner 
with all segments of society and government and subsequently presented to the official 
financing community as a prescription for effective utilisation of concessional financial 
assistance. The implementation of the agreed economic reforms (exchanged in return for 
external resources) and the appropriate disbursement of resources is subsequently 
policed through greater oversight of government resource generation and public 
expenditure management. 
 
Accordingly, the Bank and Fund view the PRS approach as one of ‘balancing mutual 
accountabilities’ – of governments to domestic constituents and official financiers and of 
official financiers to governments of client countries – over the use of state economic 
resources.12 The key to utilising the PRSP approach as such a platform for ‘mutual 
accountability’ is the establishment of ‘specific operational plans that support PRS 
implementation and donor alignment’,13 along the lines of an established universal 
normative framework.  
 
This universal framework is derived from a set of prescriptive but not mandatory 
templates for strategic policymaking outlined in the PRSP Sourcebook14 with normative 
indicators – targets for ‘developmental objectives’ – derived from largely from the 
MDGs.15 Conformity with these norms are evaluated by Bank and Fund staff via a series 
of questions in the JSAN, including, inter alia, evaluations of the adequacy of the 
country’s poverty diagnosis; appropriateness of medium and long-term poverty reduction 
and other developmental targets; establishment and viability of priority public actions,; 
and the adequacy of governance and public sector management reforms.16 The 
gatekeeping function of the Bretton Woods institutions to other sources of development 
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financing17 and the logic of their adjustment economics are thus sustained through this 
PRS evaluation process. 
 
Yet, herein lays the fundamental premise – and the fundamental problem – of the PRSP 
framework – that is, the framework serves to a large extent, as a regulatory restraint for 
the states subject to its discipline. It follows, from the conceptual principles and 
operational directives underpinning the PRSP approach, that the PRSP state as recipient 
of concessional financing and debt relief, must demonstrate its desire to be disciplined by 
a set of rules constituting the values which represent the universal normative framework 
for all state resource extraction, allocation and administration.  
 
The PRSP framework involves a substantial reorganisation of state apparatuses in PRSP 
countries, facilitating not only the universalisation of national economic planning – the 
setting of uniform ‘development’ targets and common prioritisation of public policy – 
but also a globalisation of bureaucratic and political structures – the establishment of a 
template for public participatory policymaking and inter-governmental policy dialogue. 
These extensive interventions belie the PRSP project’s rhetoric of ‘country ownership’ 
inasmuch as it serves to establish comity with the neoliberal norms of the current 
international economic order. Conformity with the status quo is assured by excluding 
those states who fail to play by the rules, not through force but through the evaluation of 
their willingness to be subjected to ‘universally’ recognised policy objectives and the 
corresponding logic of adjustment norms to secure these objectives. 
 
 
PRSPS AS A RESPONSE TO CRISIS IN THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER 
 
REINVENTING THE WHEEL 
 
The paradoxical straightjacketing of PRSP countries in the face of official rhetoric of 
‘ownership’, ‘partnership’ and ‘participation’ is by no means a happy accident of 
circumstance. Conventional narratives of the PRSP framework, both in policy circles and 
academic scholarship, often fail to locate the genesis of the PRSP project within a 
specific temporal and geo-political space, the contextulisation of which will serve to 
further elucidate the function of the PRSP framework as a mechanism for reshaping 
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third world state engagement with international law, in particular international economic 
law. 
 
PRSPs can be foregrounded in the evolution of development financing over the mid-and 
late-1990s and, more importantly, in the aftermath of a crisis of legitimacy in the 
international economic order in the late 1990s. The operationalising of a framework, 
such as the PRSP, linking a political and social governance agenda to disbursement of 
financial resources, was catalysed largely by an imperative to restore relevance to existing 
structures of multilateral trade and finance, notably to third world states and to mitigate 
the groundswell of public dissent to the free-wheeling policies of the globalised 
Washington Consensus18, which were, in many cases, bankrolled by the IFIs, during the 
same period.  
 
The temporal convergence between the shifting institutional agendas of the Bretton 
Woods institutions and the geo-strategic need on the part of the northern countries – the 
‘rule-makers’19 of the international economy and underwriters of concessional finance –  
to quell disquiet in the international economic order resulted in widespread support for 
PRSP and its attendant financing instruments. 
 
The World Bank, notably, is famous for its periodic reinvention and many view the 
PRSP approach as the consolidation of the changes in the organisational practice of the 
Bank over the past three decades. The mandatory participatory PRS process creates a 
binding requirement out of what was previously a ‘best practice’ guideline under what 
Miller-Adams terms as the World Bank’s ‘participation agenda’ involving the inclusion of 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and other civil society actors in the design and 
policy dialogue of Bank operations.20  
 
This deliberate policy of inclusion –  which started gaining ground in the early 1990s with 
the development of participatory poverty assessments (PPAs) and peaking with the 
Bank’s involvement in (and subsequent disengagement from) the Structural Adjustment 
Participatory Review Initiative (SAPRI) in 1996 – reflects what organisational theorists 
term as ‘cooptation’ – a ‘strategy through which institutions buffer themselves from 
pressures arising in the environment’ by ‘incorporating alien and sometimes hostile 
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elements into their decision-making structure … to defuse external opposition to their 
activities’.21  
 
Consequently, as some observers have suggested, this incorporation ‘reflects a conscious 
political containment strategy’ with the Bank responding to its own crisis of credibility 
‘from member countries, pressure groups and business interests’ by attempting to 
‘accommodate these demands through ever more inclusive and wide-ranging 
consultation mechanisms’.22  
 
CRISIS OF LEGITIMACY 
 
The PRSP framework can thus be regarded as the operational manifestation of what 
Higgott describes as a ‘mood swing’ in the global political economy ‘from the 
Washington Consensus to the Post Washington Consensus’, driven by the recognition, in 
policy and academic circles, ‘that globalization has to be politically legitimized, 
democratized and socialized if the gains of the economic liberalization process are not to be 
lost to its major beneficiaries’.23  
 
This, in turn, was driven largely by the urgency to reassert the dominance of northern 
financier countries over peripheral nations in the south in the face of dissonance within 
the international political economy in the late 1990s and the threat of mass third world 
revolt to the rapaciousness of neoliberal measures pushed through a raft of regulatory 
regimes at the time – from the aborted Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), the 
recently established and potentially omniscient World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), heightened by the decade-old 
conditionalities of debt restructuring and structural adjustment.  
 
Third world state resistance to the international economic order and the patterns of 
unequal economic globalisation during this period was bolstered by the aforementioned 
rising tide of citizenry dissent and global mass mobilisations against domestic structural 
adjustment and debt overhang and structural economic iniquity at the global level, and 
compelled by mounting evidence against the policies of the Washington Consensus and 
neoliberal globalisation. The social and economic dislocations of the Asian financial 
crises of 1997 and the Latin American and Russian contagion of 1998 and the fiscal 
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austerity that accompanied the ensuing IMF adjustment programmes in affected 
countries heightened the global loss of faith in international economy, precipitating, in 
many respects, a series of third world rebellions in the global governance arena, from the 
collective ministerial walk-out of the Seattle WTO summit to the unilateral dismissal of 
IMF intervention in Mahathir-era Malaysia.  
 
The impetus to control potentially insurgent nation states in the south represented a very 
real geo-political motivation in the drive to institutionalise the post-Washington 
Consensus in these countries, particularly when such resistance posed a real danger to the 
functioning of the existing international economy and the global juridical order which 
sustains it. Pahuja, in reference to the IMF surveillance function in the post-Asian 
Financial Crisis era, refers to the twin motivations of postcolonial governance of 
international economic law – the ‘fear of exit’ and the paradoxical ‘fear of entry’ of third 
world states which continue to haunt the participation of such states in the international 
economic order: 
 
The effect of the eternal presence of the spectre of the Third World 
primodialism means that implicit in the articulation of the fear of entry and 
the risk of systemic breakdown immanent in that entry, is the fear of exit, 
or the desire to prevent nations in financial difficulties from dropping out 
of the international system altogether.24 
 
The PRSP framework, as a subset of the larger post-Washington Consensus, may be 
viewed as a means of quelling this potential danger of ‘exit’ of third world states in the 
face of, to borrow a phrase from Stiglitz, ‘globalization and its discontents’,25 particularly 
of low-income countries for whom the benefits of global economic integration had 
yielded little reward. While the PRSP only extends to the peripheral nations of the global 
economy, mostly located in sub-Saharan Africa– as opposed to the politically powerful 
Asian and Latin American middle-income countries – the importance of maintaining this 
bloc of countries within the global capitalist system is as much an exercise of discourse as 
one of utility, the offsetting of the loss of faith in the policies of globalisation.  
 
At the same time, the PRSP framework tackles the danger of ‘primodialism’ that 
accompany these countries’ insertion into the system – the potentially disruptive force of 
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an inclusion into the international economic order of countries whose domestic 
regulatory apparatuses lack the maturity and sophistication to perform the disciplinary 
and redistributive functions of a state that is imperative to govern and mitigate the effects 
of an integrated market economy. The conceptual and operational emphasis of ‘country 
ownership’, ‘partnership’, ‘participation’ and ‘poverty reduction’ of the PRSP framework 
serves a dual purpose in providing the incentive for southern states to remain in the 
international system and instituting the requisite discipline to regulate this continued 
participation by providing the framework for states to diffuse internal opposition and 
alleviate the social and economic dislocations of economic globalisation. 
 
This ‘crisis of legitimacy’ in global politics and in the governance of the international 
economic order is absent from conventional narratives of PRSP historiography and 
consequently, masks the genesis of the PRSP as a response to this crisis. Critically, this 
absence prevents comprehensive analysis of the role of the PRSP project in reframing 
fundamental tenets of global collective responsibility and obscuring the need for revising 
the rules of international economic law in the face of the social, economic and political 
marginalisation of third world states and communities from the integrated global market. 
 
REINSCRIBING DISCIPLINE AND ORDER VIA THE AEGIS OF THE STATE 
 
The conceptual and operational premise of the PRSP framework not only reflects the 
imperative to discipline errant states in the global economy but also that of maintaining 
the asymmetries in the international economic order and therefore, the hegemony of the 
northern states who underwrite the rules of multilateral engagement. The response to the 
aforementioned ‘crisis of legitimacy’ is therefore not one predicated upon the revision of 
international economic law but one that revises state engagement with the law and the 
political economy which sustains it.  
 
Correspondingly, the response of the PRSP framework to the social and economic 
marginalisation of states and communities resultant from the neoliberal globalisation 
underwritten by the rules of international trade and finance is not one of international 
redistributive justice nor one of reparational justice but one of bilateral and multilateral 
financial mediation on the terms established by the hegemon states. The pivoting of all discourse 
of social and economic exclusion on the issue of ‘aid’ and the merit of countries to 
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receive ‘aid’ subverts the real and persistent causes of such marginalisation in the global 
economy. 
 
In the monograph from which this paper is drawn, I argue that the current drive to 
rehabilitate the state apparatus in developing countries through the PRSP framework 
stem not from the desire to transfer genuine policy autonomy to these economically and 
politically marginalised states but from the need to: 1) co-opt recalcitrant states into 
submitting to the necessary regulatory and policy reforms for the conducive operation of 
transnational capital, or, in the case of ‘failed states’ or post-conflict states, to restore the 
basic institutional frameworks to pursue such reforms; and 2) mitigate the dislocations 
associated with the pursuit of such reforms through the rehabilitation of the state’s 
regulatory and economic oversight function, and to a lesser extent, its function as an 
overseer of citizenry welfare.26 
 
PROBLEMATISING THE STATE 
 
The mode of engagement forwarded by the PRSP framework is one that transfers to the 
affected state autonomy over, but correspondingly, responsibility for state interaction with 
and commitment to the norms, legal or otherwise, of the international economy. The 
effects of the state’s wilful entry into the international market and the rules which govern 
it are correspondingly borne by the state with assistance from the ‘international’ 
community to mitigate the dislocations of adjustment. Correspondingly, redistributive 
justice under the PRSP framework takes place in the domestic sphere, not the 
international, if at all. 
 
‘Poverty’ in PRSP countries is less rooted in the ‘international’ than in the ‘national’, 
caused primarily not from the lack of financial resources caused by the iniquities of 
current rules of global trade and finance but by a) states’ incapacity to generate or absorb 
financial resources due to inappropriate fiscal, monetary or structural economic policy 
choices; and b) states’ inability or disinclination to utilise resources generated in a 
productive and redistributive manner. The failure of structural adjustment policies in 
these countries, leading to social and economic dislocations, have more to do with ‘policy 
slippages’ and not ‘policy design’.27 
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The state is thus problematised in the context of ‘poverty reduction’ and ‘development’ –  
the inability to reap the benefits of globalisation or to effectively utilise ‘aid’ allocated is 
attributed to the ‘inefficient’ and ‘predatory’ state and the incapacity of the state to 
organise domestic economic functions and enrol sufficient domestic political support to 
legitimise its strategic role in the economy. 
 
The function of the PRS process is thus to rehabilitate the state prescriptive and 
regulative capacity to enable better organised strategic development planning and to 
institutionalise non-state, read: civil society, oversight capacity to enable greater state 
transparency and accountability for resources generated, accumulated and distributed. 
Accordingly, the World Bank and the IMF argue that: 
 
The PRS approach provides the operational framework for governments 
to set their development priorities and to specify policies, programs and 
resources needed to achieve results. This process helps to crystallise 
political commitment and accountability – both for countries themselves 
and for their development partners – for accelerating progress towards 
the MDGs.28 
 
In framing the PRSP approach as one of ‘balancing mutual accountabilities’, the Bretton 
Woods institutions make no reference to the accountability of the international 
community to structurally adjusted states or the redistribution of unevenly acquired 
global wealth. Instead, the process is designed to procure accountability of the state to its 
citizens (downward accountability) and of the state to its external financiers (upward 
accountability).  
 
And where the institutions call for more action from ‘donors and countries alike to make 
the PRS the framework for scaling up country-level efforts to reach the MDGs’,29 there is 
an asymmetry in the obligations undertaken by the ‘donor’ community and those of 
individual countries. Where financier states play a peripheral role by undertaking to 
ensure that development assistance meets with minimum procedural standards, such as 
alignment with national budget and parliamentary cycles, the obligations undertaken by 
PRSP states, on the other hand, are much more onerous.  
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The focus of the PRSP framework has consistently centred upon the necessity of PRSP 
countries to develop a coherent programme of social sector expenditures to meet its 
international development targets without corresponding considerations to the 
underlying policy design of national economic strategies and the interaction between 
these strategies and the global economy. The onus is therefore on specific countries to 
prove their capacity to absorb the financing bequeathed to them by the northern states 
and demonstrate the institutional discipline necessary to utilise the resources.  
 
The overarching emphasis of the PRSP on domestic institutional and policy reform has 
come at the expense of tackling external pressures on countries’ capacity to deliver 
development and economic growth. As with the other components of the post-
Washington Consensus economic model, the PRSP framework does do not see the 
rolling-back of policies of liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation which 
underpinned the modalities of globalisation in the 1980s and 1990s but rather to ‘develop 
a political institutional framework to embed the structural adjustment policies of the 
Washington Consensus’.30  
 
THE NATION AS A SITE OF POLITICAL STRUGGLE AND ECONOMIC 
REDISTRIBUTION 
 
It follows from the problematising of the state in economic development under the 
PRSP approach that the national sphere has also been constituted as the primary site for 
any contestation over the resource allocation and redistribution and the state 
correspondingly ascribed with the primary duty to discharge the social and economic 
challenges ascribed collectively, such as the MDGs. 
 
The institution of a mandatory participatory policymaking process under the PRSP 
framework, while enabling a degree of domestic political franchise by opening up 
hitherto inaccessible spaces for citizenry engagement in national decision-making 
processes, diverts collective struggle away from the international towards the national. 
Discontent resulting from the social and economic dislocations of structural adjustment 
and integration into an uneven international trade and finance playing field by individual 
countries is now refocused on the state and not the community of states.  
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The emphasis in the PRSP framework of ‘priority public actions’ and the linking of state 
economic resources to clear, targeted and accountable public expenditure in social 
sectors such as health and education may result in more transparent resource allocation 
but it also places the responsibility of providing public goods onto national governments. 
This diffuses dissent to the inequality of current global economic structures and the 
injustices of global policy decisions by refocusing the debate away from the resource 
constraints third world states face as a result of external pressures towards one centred 
around how best states can allocate limited resources to meet developmental challenges. 
 
Furthermore, the access to political structures and limited possibilities for engagement in 
national strategic planning via participatory processes in individual countries have the 
effect of fracturing globalised resistance, either in the form of mass citizenry 
mobilisations or global civil society cooperation. Within the PRSP framework, struggles 
over resource allocation and modes of economic governance affecting individuals and 
communities are directed at the state apparatus through the reorganisation of political 
representative structures mediated by the IFIs and other external financiers.  
 
The reconstruction of the state in PRSP countries through the participatory process, 
therefore aids the rehabilitation of the regulative capacity of the state at the same time as 
it constrains the state by subjecting it to an internal process of accountability and external 
scrutiny of these accountability mechanisms. This reconfiguration of the political space in 
PRSP countries legitimises the process of the PRSP framework, through the restructuring 
of social relations between state and non-state actors and external financiers, as well as 
conferring credibility on the substantive content of the resultant social and economic 
policies, even as it fails to reform the existing policy and practice of development 
financing.  
 
Confinement of emancipatory politics within the territorial boundaries of a nation state, 
and within it, the geographical boundaries of the district and the villages, not only 
problematises the state – the ‘inefficient’, ‘predatory’ state – but also creates a 
cartography of impoverishment which localises poverty to create a disempowering 
counter-discourse. Reducing economic marginalisation and social inequity to the lowest 
territorial denominator not only distorts the magnitude of the problem, it localises the 
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politics of poverty by suggesting that this is where the dislocations are most acute and 
where interventions should be targeted.  
 
At the same time, the process legitimises these policy interventions inasmuch as they 
legitimise the institutional presence of the World Bank, the IMF and bilateral financiers 
in third world states. The PRSP process subjects the state to greater external scrutiny, not 
only just of its economic policies but of its practice of governance itself, hence increasing 
its exposure to greater external remedial action, through interventions of the ‘donor’ 
states seeking to mediate in the development of domestic political franchise.  This has 
created a culture of upward rather than downward accountability, contrary to the stated 
objectives of the PRSP project itself. Recipient states remain highly accountable to the 
international financial institutions and donors but rarely vice-versa, and donors, not 
domestic constituents, remain the primary consumers of financial information and 
government performance review under this new regime31. This increases external 
oversight of government policies and expenditures but does not necessarily improve 
accountability for public decisions. 
 
SUBVERTING THE ‘RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT’ 
 
The assignment of responsibility for addressing developmental challenges to individual 
nation states is not exclusive to the PRSP framework. It reflects the conceptual 
framework that has consistently guided official aid flows from northern to southern 
states in the postcolonial period which have sought to resist the incorporation of any 
language of redistribution or universal collective responsibility in the area of social and 
economic cooperation in bilateral and multilateral financing relationships.  
 
The circumscription of the role of the international community, particularly that of the 
northern states and northern capital which represent the principal beneficiaries of the 
current international economic order, in any normative framework for international 
development has been a significant feature of all international negotiations in the area of 
trade, finance and development cooperation since the collapse of the third world 
movement for a New International Economic Order (NIEO)32 in the 1970s and 1980s 
and the gradual erosion of the UNCTAD mandate in the structural adjustment era. 
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The refusal of western states to acknowledge collective responsibility for the condition of 
third world states and to accept complicity in their social and economic marginalisation 
from the international economic order was evidenced by the north-south split33 in the 
voting patterns for the UN Declaration on the Right to Development in 1986. The 
Declaration, championed by the Group of 77 developing states stressed ‘the collective 
obligation of all states to create a just and equitable international environment for the 
realisation of the right to development’ and emphasised ‘a collective duty of all states to 
eliminate barriers, such as unfair trade rules and the debt burden’.34  
 
The most heavily contested elements of the declaration involved questions on the nature 
of the right to development, specifically the assignment of rights and duties, and the 
balance between the national and international characteristics of these rights and duties. 
 
For southern governments, the ‘right to development’ is international in character and 
the responsibility for realising such a right ‘cannot remain at the national level’ as 
‘globalisation, international trade, foreign domestic economic policies, foreign debt and 
intellectual property rights constrain national development efforts’. The ‘right to 
development’ therefore encompasses a revision of the rules of international trade and 
finance to enable greater participation and control of developing countries in the global 
economy, including but not exclusive to the establishment of international mechanisms 
to implement the principles of the 1986 Declaration. Specifically, the southern states 
have argued that this right ‘cannot be reduced to international development assistance, 
nor to national eradication programmes’.35 
 
In contrast, contemporary interpretations of the ‘right to development’ by northern 
states are based on the ‘partnership’ model which underpins the PRSP framework – ‘one 
based on shared responsibilities and mutual commitments between developed and 
developing countries and international organisations’.36 In particular, northern 
governments do not recognise the provisions of the 1986 Declaration as forming part of 
customary human rights law nor forming a normative basis for their aid financing, 
external trade and foreign policies vis-à-vis developing states.  
 
Instead, these governments have generally interpreted the ‘right to development’ as a 
right of individuals against states, notably the right of citizens in developing countries 
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against their own states, and not a right exercised by states against other states. While 
recognising the international dimension of the’ right to development’, northern 
governments have argued that it is states which ‘have primary responsibility for the 
realising of the [right to development]’37 and that such ‘assistance is based on a moral – 
not legal – obligation to alleviate poverty’.38 
 
Consequently, all subsequent international negotiations on social and economic 
cooperation have been couched along the lines of the new language of ‘partnership’ and 
‘poverty reduction’ in contrast to the call for international cooperation and redistributive 
justice that underpinned southern calls for a NIEO. The Monterrey Consensus, adopted 
at the 2002 UN Financing for Development (FFD) Conference, for example declared 
that achieving such targets ‘demands a new partnership between developed and developing 
countries’ including the commitment to ‘sound policies, good governance at all levels and 
the rule of law’.39 
 
The PRSP framework not only provides the operational mechanism for such a 
partnership but it also ensures that discussions for external resources and redressing 
social and economic exclusion of countries remain at the level of the state and at the level 
of individual financing arrangements with official creditors, whether on a bilateral or 
multilateral basis. By establishing the parameters for negotiation within a small cartel of 
donors and creditors, the discourse created by the PRSP approach limits the capacity for 
PRSP countries’ to form collective demands for equity at the international level. 
 
Moreover, the emphasis on ‘poverty reduction’ as priority governmental action subverts 
the principle of ‘development’ encompassing calls for fairer rules in the international 
economic order to facilitate such growth. It does not address the asymmetries which 
prevent countries’ attainment of fuller economic and social objectives,  for example, the 
redress of declining terms of trade for commodity-dependent states in the south as a 
result of continuing depreciation of prices for primary commodities, the tariff escalation 
rules in multilateral trade law and the intransigence of northern policies on agricultural 
subsidies40. The core of the PRSP framework thus reflects an effort to ‘manage’ world 
poverty rather than to resolve it. 
 
A NEW REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
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The PRSP framework signals a larger paradigmatic shift in the cartography of aid and, 
consequently, in the constitution of north-south relations. However, the operational 
efficacy of this wholesale revision of the modalities of countries’ engagement with the 
international community exemplifies the current international legal order in which third 
world states remain objects of international law rather than its subjects.  
 
The characterisation of PRSP countries as legitimate sites for remedial interventions – 
social, economic and political – not only resonates with the aforementioned ‘civilising 
mission’ and technologies of colonial management but also demonstrates the way in 
which the ‘colonial encounter’ continues to shape third world engagement with 
international law. The extensive intrusions of the PRSP framework into the body politic 
of the structurally adjusted state could only be made possible where the initial sovereignty 
of states were circumscribed by their entry into the postcolonial international legal order 
and where such political sovereignty and state autonomy over natural resources and over 
external state relations and state access to global institutions of governance have been 
progressively eroded by interventions of the postcolonial global regulatory instruments. 
 
Thus, this paper argues, in a similar vein to Anghie’s analysis of the ‘good governance’ 
project which preceded the PRSP framework, that the insertion of the PRSP framework 
into sovereign lending operations masks ‘the imperial character’ of international law 
‘even when it is being reproduced in a way that powerfully shapes contemporary 
international relations’.41 The recognition of third world states and the legitimacy of third 
world claims under international law thus becomes premised on: a) their capacity to 
demonstrate adherence to norms established by the ‘international’ legal order; and b) in 
their failure to demonstrate the former, their willingness to be rehabilitated and 
acceptance of interventions for reform so that they may be restructured into compliance.  
 
At the heart of the PRSP reforms is therefore the validation of clientelist relationship 
between the north and the south and the logic of dependence and universalisation which 
underpin these relationships. For Badie, this relationship of dependence necessitates the 
constitutional and juridical imitation of the patron state by the client state for continued 
access by the dependent client state to external resource mobilisation.42 In the case of 
PRSP states, the mimicry assumes the form of adopting public expenditure management 
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systems, national strategic planning and political orders of the west. This, in turn, mirrors 
the reforms that third world states have had to adopt in other areas of international 
economic law, such as trade, intellectual property rights, finance and investment, which 
have necessitated the embedding of imported legal rules and institutions for the purpose 
of attracting foreign capital and facilitating external trade. 
 
The historical reading of the PRSP framework; its situation within a continuum of 
political events and policy narratives in the period preceding its inception and its 
contextualisation within the legacy of postcolonial economic relations enables us to 
ascribe the framework with a wider economic, geo-political and legal significance beyond 
its immediacy as an instrument for regulating aid disbursement. In this manner, the PRSP 
project establishes a new regulatory framework which restructures third world state 
engagement with the global economy and the international legal instruments which 
support it.  
 
This new configuration of politics brought about by the principle of ‘ownership’ in 
conditionality has not extinguished the politics of adjustment nor the power relations 
inherent in conditions of donor dependency, but has rather resulted in a situation where 
external intervention is exercised not through coercive financing terms ‘but also to a 
significant degree though closer involvement in state institutions and the employment of 
incentive finance’, a situation Harrison terms as the ‘post-conditionality’ regime.43 
 
Again, in the monograph from which this paper is drawn, I argue that the PRSP 
framework constitutes a new form of discipline of third world states in the current 
postcolonial period, representing both a continuation and an extension of old 
mechanisms of imperial and neo-imperial control.44 This transition may be framed as the 
beginnings of a transition from Foucault’s ‘disciplinary society’ to a ‘society of control’ 
vis-a-vis the governance of third world states. This new regulatory regime relies less on 
‘disciplinary power’ and the ‘technologies of domination’– the establishment of 
normative frameworks for behaviour and the exclusion and penalisation for departures 
from such norms – but on ‘bio-political power’ and the ‘technologies of self’ – in which 
objects of power reproduce the dominant norms and seek to insert themselves into the 
very relationships of power.45 Thus, the agenda for norm brokerage and rule-making in 
the international political economy and the international economic law which supports it 
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depends less on the establishment of coercive rules and principles for engagement and 
more on the discretionary application of ‘voluntary’ accession to the discipline of the 
‘development’ financiers. 
 
At the same time, the concepts that are problematised by the PRSP project, namely 
poverty reduction, participation and national ownership, are constituted as new areas of 
regulation through dynamics of power and influence that underlie the formulation of this 
initiative. In this respect, the implications of the PRSP project reverberate beyond the 
policy and institutional incorporation of resistance to encompass a much wider range of 
cause and effect and include the production and dissemination of discourses on 
‘development’ and constructions of ‘poverty’. The language of the PRSP framework has 
important resonance in movements for social and economic justice but equally, and 
somewhat conversely, it also shapes the debate about the nature of international 
economic relations and represents the narratives that have gained currency in the context 
of these relationships due to the hegemony of the actors who underwrite their 
emergence. This ancillary process of knowledge production has, once again, created a 
universal framework through which knowledge about heterogeneous cultures, and socio-
political and economic organisation has been collected, filtered and disseminated, 
establishing a frame of reference which disciplines through marginalisation and exclusion 
of those which fall outside these received identities.  
 
The implications of this on the wider global regulatory structures and networks are 
significant. As discussed previously, the emphasis on developing and fulfilling priorities 
established in conformity with the parameters set by the PRSP framework –  and within 
the qualified notions of ‘poverty reduction’, ‘participation’ and ‘ownership’ – thus shifts 
the debate away from the international arena and places the burden of meeting the 
challenge of social and economic developmental objectives on national governments. It 
is the nation state – the structurally adjusted, indebted, aid dependant state – that now 
bears the primary responsibility for ensuring that the communally-ascribed Millennium 
Development Goals are met through a further programme of structural adjustment (now 
renamed ‘development policy’ operations), foreclosing debate on issues of international 
economic justice, redistribution and communal responsibility for the provision and 
protection of public goods. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, I have tried to situate the inception of PRSP project within a specific 
temporal and geo-political context in order to demonstrate the impact of the framework 
on current developments in the global economic arena, particularly in relation to the 
revision of existing rules of international economic law and/or the development of new 
international instruments to combat the excesses of neoliberal globalisation. 
 
Specifically, this paper argues that the PRSP project’s focus on individual state 
responsibility rather than a collective responsibility fractures resistance through forcing 
countries to compete with each other for economic resources disbursed on the terms 
established by the financier states rather than a focus on redistributive justice. This is 
achieved through: a) the discounting of the role of the ‘international’ in the resolution of 
social and economic exclusion within states, particularly developing states in the south 
subject to the torrents of globalised neoliberalism and b) rupturing communal struggles 
to the forces of international impoverishment calling for a revisiting and revisioning of 
the rules of the international economy through the incentive of individual engagement. 
 
The nation state that is reconstituted under this framework is therefore one that is 
facilitative of the project of global neoliberalism and northern corporatism, rehabilitated 
through a series of institutional interventions of the PRSP framework. Such an 
assignment of responsibility, predicated upon the unquestioning acceptance of the status 
quo of economic globalisation processes, obfuscates the role of the international 
community in securing economic justice for economically marginalised nation states and 
their impoverished constituencies. 
 
Conceptualising ‘poverty reduction’ as a priority policy intervention and ‘ownership’ as a 
political project forecloses negotiations for the reform of the rules of international trade 
and finance facilitating the exploitative relationships that underlie the impoverishment 
and suffering of communities in PRSP countries. While the PRSP framework infuses a 
purpose of political franchise - through participatory policymaking and notional 
conferment of policy ownership – into the dynamic of the financing relationships 
between countries and their external financiers and inscribes a social contractual 
relationship between governments and their citizens, the project does not address the 
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fundamental iniquities within the international order which necessitates the existence of 
such financing and debt relief.  
 
Consequently, the danger of the PRSP project is that the discourse and methods of 
resistance against the injustices of the international order have been appropriated to distil 
such dissent through qualified operationalising of contestable notions of ‘participation, 
‘ownership’, ‘partnership’ and ‘poverty reduction’ and the translation of these notions 
into the norms and principles regulating third world engagement with the exterior. The 
PRSP framework thus serves a disciplinary and legitimising function vis-à-vis the 
asymmetries that continue to characterise the postcolonial economy and exemplifies the 
shifting nature of power at the international level necessary to maintain these 
asymmetries and manifested in the international legal order which sustains it.  
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